Contracting out and accountability
Abstract
Contracting out raises important issues of accountability, as recognised by the inquiry being conducted by the Senate Finance and Public Administration References Committee. The claim made by the Industry Commission that contracting out does not reduce government accountability for public services is mistaken. Contracting out involves a trade-off of political accountability for efficiency. Contracting out inevitably involves some reduction in accountability through the removal of direct departmental and ministerial control over the day-to-day actions of contractors and their staff. Indeed, the removal of such control is essential to the rationale for contracting out because the main increases in efficiency come from the greater freedom allowed to contracting providers. Accountability is also likely to be reduced through the reduced availability of citizen redress under such instruments as the Ombudsman and FOI. At the same time, accountability may on occasion be increased through improved departmental and ministerial control following from greater clarification of objectives and specification of standards. Providers may also become more responsive to public needs through the forces of market competition. Potential losses (and gains) in accountability need to be balanced against potential efficiency gains in each case.