The causal-process-model theory of mechanisms
Abstract
Wesley Salmon and the author of this chapter have argued that causation and causal explanation need to appeal to causal processes understood in terms of conserved quantities. This has the consequence of ruling out absence 'causation' as being genuine causation. Carl Craver has argued persuasively that absences are crucial in causal explanations in neuroscience, and so he gives an account of mechanisms in terms of causal relevance where the latter is understood along the lines of causal modelling. This allows for absences to be causes and hence to feature in causal explanations, but it is not compatible with the claim that causal explanation needs to appeal to causal processes understood in terms of conserved quantities. This chapter therefore offers an account of mechanisms, in particular the role of causal relevance in mechanisms, which can respect the theory that causation involves causal processes understood in terms of conserved quantities, but which also allows absences to figure in causal explanation.