Chalmers, David J.2025-04-042025-04-04researchoutputwizard:a383154xPUB27178Scopus:85053503714https://dspace-test.anu.edu.au/handle/1885/733755075The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness. Just as metacognition is cognition about cognition, and a meta-theory is a theory about theories, the meta-problem is a problem about a problem. The initial problem is the hard problem of consciousness: why and how do physical processes in the brain give rise to conscious experience? The meta-problem is the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem, or in other terms, the problem of explaining why we think consciousness is hard to explain.56English2018http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85053503714&partnerID=8YFLogxK