Yang, LinXu, MaoFan, JingliLiang, XiZhang, XianLv, HaodongWang, Dong2025-04-012025-04-01researchoutputwizard:a383154xPUB21986Scopus:85114195678WOS:WOS:000696801600005https://dspace-test.anu.edu.au/handle/1885/733750745Traditional policy incentives for carbon capture and storage (CCS) mainly rely on fiscal subsidies, which tend to put an inordinate strain on public finances. This study attempts to explore a non-fiscal incentive policy, granting a time extension (extra electricity quota), to finance early CCS demonstration projects in China. We find that coal-fired power plant (CFPP) operate at a loss even without CCS retrofitting under the current electricity quota (4000 h per year), while it can make profits with CCS retrofitting if extra electricity quotas are provided. Specifically, the electricity quota needs to be roughly 4709–7260 h per year with the CO2 capture level ranging from 0.1 to 1 Mt per year in the demonstration stage. In particular, the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) of CFPP with a capture level of 1 Mt per year is estimated at 298.8 CNY/MWh if the electricity quota reaches 7000 h per year, which is approximately equal to that of CFPP without CCS retrofitting and extra electricity quota (292.2 CNY/MWh). Thus, the extra electricity quota can be considered as an economically feasible policy incentive, and related results are able to provide useful information for electric power enterprises and government decision-makers.This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 71804166 ) and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (No. 2652019082 ).EnglishPublisher Copyright: © 2021 Elsevier LtdCCSElectricity quotaFinancingLCOEPolicy incentive202110.1016/j.enpol.2021.112562http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85114195678&partnerID=8YFLogxK